DawgNotes

Aristotle wrote, “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion" (36).

Posing this definition with the first word "let" sets it up as a premise to be built on, rather than a proposition to be proved of itself. The entire definition poses an analytical process - an ability to see, which is not the same as an ability to practice the identified means, and yet the successful practice would also require the ability to identify the available options, and making a determination as to the most effective one. So while analysis and practice can be separated here, it is a symbiotic separation.

Kennedy brackets the word "particular" but I believe it's an essential modifier for a broad application of this definition. "Each case" should indicate that every situation is unique, but the inclusion of "particular" makes that clear. Aristotle says it is the hearer(s), the audience to whom the speech is addressed, that determines the objective [telos] of the speech (and therefore, logically, its success). What all makes up the case? The audience, certainly, but also the culture from which the audience and speaker emerge, education, religion or other values/beliefs, the political structure and the degree to which public discourse is encouraged, supported, repressed or limited, the occasion or prompt for the speech, or just the dispostion of the audience that day. All these things make up the case, or the situation, or the scene, in which the rhetoric event takes place. And each of this is different. Hence the first question is: what is the case? what are the factors that make up the setting for this rhetorical event, and how, if at all, might those factors sway the outcome of the event? Both the analyst examing the event after the fact and the rhetor preparing for the vent need to understand, as much as possible, what the case is.

The next piece is the "available means." This includes not only the appeals through logos, pathos and ethos, but also avenues of access. Editors Joy Ritchie and Kay Ronald choose this phrase for the title to their anthology of women's rhetoric, calling attention to the fact that for women, many means were not available to them. (Note that I did not include this anthology on my original reading list, but having read what I've read, I now think it belongs there). Denied a place in the public realm, women had to find other ways to get their message out, to get assistance or justice when needed. They had to be able to see beyond the immediate and find what was available to them through connections, relationships, conversation or even letter writing. I'm thinking here of Aspasia, who in Cheryl Glenn's historical reconstruction, used her sexual access to Pericles to get her words into the public forum. At the same time, Pericles used what was available to him, Aspasia's brilliance, to find the words, the phrases, and perhaps even the rehearsal to make the funeral speech that brought him honor. Aspasia didn't appeal to be allowed to speak in public herself, but she did ensure that her words, and therefore she, would not be lost in history.

This phrase can also be broken down into its two parts: available, and means. What is available? Not just counting the public forums, or the call to speak, or the designated places for public discourse, but what relationships or avenues are available to the would be rhetor? For example, Julian of Norwich invoked the authority of God speaking through her. That made speaking/writing for a public audience available to her in a time where women, particularly in the church, were denied public speech. In the nineteenth century, African American women found availability to speak in the work of women's clubs and other platforms for social reforms. The other question - that of means - is also important. What means can be/were employed in the situation? Means could be a public speech, a private conversation, a letter, a messenger, a song, a story, or even a poem. In any case, some means are available and some aren't, and when more than one means is available, the rhetor choose a course, and the analyst later evaluates that choice.

Of persuasion. Kennedy and other historians have noted that in Aristotle's Athens, rhetorical contests were highly agonistic, a reflection of a society that valued competition whether in war or sport (the Olympics were a Greek invention that served a valuable purpose for warriors not at war, and satisfied the cultural desire for competition), or public speech/debate. The measure of persuasion was a favorable decision by the audience. Whether in cases of a policy to be adopted, or the investigation into a breach of that policy and the necessary penalty, that rhetor was successful who got the audience to vote as he wished. But in other societies, where such agonistic debate was not so highly valued, the measure of persuasion necessarily changed. In nearly every case, as Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca explained, the measure of persuasion ultimately was/is the adherence of the audience to the belief that the rhetor proposed, as shown by action.

"So," Wise Woman asked, "is rhetoric always analysis?"
"Yes," said humble student, "except when it is practice."

Stay tuned. More follows.