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February 28, 2007

Potential Exam Questions - Rhetoric

After reviewing the questions from prior CCR exams, and revising a draft post I will be finalizing later today as a result of this exercise, I came up with the following as a starting point for [a] question[s] for the major exam in Rhetoric. The comments function has been repaired, so any and all comments will be welcome.


In the ancient world, education in rhetoric prepared men to participate in civic affairs, from the democracy of Athens to the Republic of Rome to the university halls of Scotland, England, and the United States. Over the years, rhetoric was lost as a discipline, recovered, revised and adapted across a range of social and cultural systems. In the last half of the twentieth century, rhetoric enjoyed resurgence as a discipline, including PhD programs focusing on composition and rhetoric, as well as speech communication. Rhetoric has been described as a content-less discipline or art, both in the ancient and contemporary worlds. Yet the growth of doctoral programs suggests an ongoing need for and interest in rhetorical education.

In a time when university education is increasingly specialized and diverse, both in terms of curriculum and student base, what place do you see for education in rhetoric? Are rhetoric’s current disciplinary affiliations adequate? Can education in rhetoric serve a broader purpose? If it is a content-less discipline, as some have argued, how would you define rhetoric as a subject and what would instruction in rhetoric include? If there is a value to rhetoric as the center of a university education, what is that value and what concepts and terms from the history of rhetoric seem most useful in structuring such an education? For what kind of citizenship would such an education prepare students? What might be the effect on other university disciplines if rhetoric were a core subject for all students? How might education in rhetoric include developing speaking and writing skills without becoming purely prescriptive? Should education in rhetoric be focused only on public forums and service? What other purposes might education in rhetoric serve and how might these be included in a curriculum? In your answer discuss relevant historical figures and contexts (i.e., time period, location, government, dominant belief systems, etc.) and, as much as possible, connect theories to potential applications within and beyond the university.

Comments and suggestions welcome!

Posted by cageyer at 11:24 AM | Comments (0)

February 26, 2007

Starting to figure it out

A short while ago, I was reviewing a little short textbook on argument, thinking about using it for my then-upcoming WRT 195 class. This book, Good Reasons: Designing and Writing Effective Arguments, was written by Lester Faigley and Jack Selzer. The authors begin by discussing Silent Spring, the reasons it became such a hit/classic, and how that text demonstrates principles of argument. I particularly liked their analysis of Carson's intervention is an otherwise dominant dialogue. The authors move on to discuss several types of argument, including visual, narrative, causal, etc. I thought it would be great to pair this book with Silent Spring, which I don't think anyone reads anymore, and the other texts they analyze as the readings for a course.

Jack Selzer also wrote one of my favorite chapters in What Writing Does and How It Does It: An Introduction to Analyzing Texts and Textual Practices. The chapter is "Rhetorical Analysis: Understanding How Texts Persuade Readers." I found his explanation of rhetorical analysis to provide an excellent umbrella theory for the other topics in that book (that's fodder for another post, however).

Now I'm reading Kenneth Burke's A Rhetoric of Motives in detail, with a view to exams, and I'm finding myself, for the first time ever, interested in being able to teach a graduate level course in a comp/rhet program. The course would feature this text, and all of the readings he discusses and analyzes in developing his philosophy of rhetoric. The range here is amazing, from the ancient Greek and Roman rhetoric teachers and orators to English Literature, to political economists, to Marx, to philosophers. Most of the references I've either read, or at least heard of, but what an interesting course that would be (for me, anyway) because Burke's point is that with a widened view of what persuasion is and his concept of identification as the other key to understanding rhetoric, every discipline has something to offer to the understanding of rhetoric, and rhetoric has a foundation to offer to every discipline. Exactly what I've long been thinking. Rhetoric should be a central part of the university, and should serve as a foundational course for all other disciplines, such that material from all other disciplines is considered in rhetoric instruction. Phew! How big an agenda would that be?

Anyway, I was reading blog posts yesterday about the nature of rhetoric instruction, where one entry remarked on the distance between the first year composition course, where students might get some degree of instruction in rhetoric, and the PhD course in rhet/comp, with not much in between. Someone proposed rhetoric as a major. Well, a liberal arts education used to be philosophically driven (hence the ultimate title) and rhetoric and philosophy still seem closely aligned, so why not?

So if I have this spark, this first ever thought about a graduate course (which I see as being an introductory course at the graduate level), maybe I am starting to have a definable sense of my own place in all this that I can articulate and attach to established theories. Wouldn't that be something?!

Posted by cageyer at 10:26 AM | Comments (0)

February 23, 2007

Kenneth Burke - Part 1

Kenneth Burke held an essentially classical view of rhetoric, believing that rhetoric was both the "use of persuasive resources and the study of them" (JWT 321). Coming from a literary background, he broadened Aristotle's view to bring rhetoric and poetics together under a theory that effective literature, like rhetoric, is designed to "elicit a response" in the reader or hearer (JWT 320). This is the basic function of rhetoric, the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents, or more specifically, "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols" (JWT 321). Language and thought are "modes of action" (GM xxii). To understand human motives, Burke developed his methodology of dramatism, and a grammar, or set of terms, to describe the elements surrounding action. The concept of motives, the five terms that make up Burke's pentad, the interplay between them, what Burke calls the ratios, and then notion of rhetoric as not only persuasion but also identification are Burke's contributions to the contemporary understanding of rhetoric.

To understand motives, one must understand the five elements, or resources, of the pentad. First, and central to the whole, is the act: what took place. Then one must identify the scene: the background or setting for the act, also known as the situation, or the environment; the agent, or actor: the person that performed the act; the agency, or the means by which the act was carried out; and the purpose: why the act was carried out. Burke says any "complete statement about motives" must include some answer for all five of these resources. But naming these elements for a given act only offers a rhetorical surface. The understanding emerges from analyzing the interplay between specific elements, or the ratios. Ten such ratios are possible: scene-act, scene-agent, scene-agency, scene-purpose, act-purpose, act-agent, act-agency, agent-purpose, agent-agency, and agency-purpose. To understand the ratios, one needs the dialectic, the give-and-take between the two elements to determine what is at stake. The ratios show where the tension is, which in turn indicates what kind of rhetoric to expect in the situation, what kind of language (symbolic action) will be employed.

In the scene-act ratio, the scene and the act should match. Put another way, the scene as a container should be fit or appropriate for the act, and the act should fit the container. In the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, the scene was one of devastation. President Bush, in delaying a response to continue his vacation and having his first act to be one of flying over the area in tourist-like fashion, performed an act that was not in keeping with the situation. The response was insufficient to the scene. In such a situation, the scene controls the act, or represents the stronger of the two elements. The scene is what moves the agent to action.

Scene is not just physical, but can include conditions, such as those inferred by the term "ground," as on "on what grounds?", which can be translated as "what kind of scene calls for such an act" (GM12). Another synonym is situation, such as it is used by politicians in policy-making. Marx's dialectical materialism placed economic conditions as scene, and claiming that the scene (the economic conditions) limited justice. In civil rights terms, the scene of a systemically racist society limits the ability of non-white citizens to rise in power or economic status despite their abilities, skills, or education.

When Burke examines various philosophies, the pentadic element of scene is a related to the philosophic term of materialism, a theory that all the facts of the universe can be explained in terms of "matter and motion" or physical elements (GM 131). The philosophic terminology featuring the pentadic element of agent is idealism, a theory that explains the universe in the work of "reason and mind" (GM 171). For agency, the terminology is pragmatism, the tendency when making a choice of action to choose that which is practical, the "means necessary for happiness" as the Baldwin dictionary describes it (GM 275). Purpose is aligned with mysticism, which can be seen as the "ends" to agency's "means" (GM 287). The act is aligned with realism, as the act "realizes the matter," (GM 227), In each case, by constructing a grammar of motives, by providing these terms to analyze human motivation, Burke elevates the role of rhetoric relative to philosophy by making philosophy rhetorical, showing how different philosophies privilege different elements from the pentad, which in turn allows an understanding of the dynamics of these ideas, how the structures are built, and then how they persuade humans to action and the types of action that might be expected under these idea structures. From Plato and the Sophists, who privileged philosophy and dismissed rhetoric, through Aristotle who recovered rhetoric and gave it a place alongside dialectic, Burke provides an even stronger defense of rhetoric through the construction of this grammar, one in which rhetoric is superior.

Returning to the ratios, the scene-agent ratio is also a container/thing contained relationship. Both the act and the agent require a scene, so that these two ratios are "in the fullet sense positive" (GM 16). The scene-agent ratio has its relationship between person and place, Burke offers as examples Carlyle's description of the Arabs in their rocky-desert country, Swift's Laputans in their floating islands, and a sonnet by Wordsworth. Carlyle described the Arabs land as "fit habitation" for their race, indicating that they shared the harsh qualities of the land. Returning to the example of New Orleans after Katrina, the scene of devastation would need a presidential response of urgency, an expression of deep concern, perhaps even a disheveled appearance from lack of sleep, and appearance fit for the scene. The scene is still in the controlling position in this ratio.

The act-agent ratio is more of a "temporal or sequential" relationship than a positional one as the previous two are. Here the act flows from the nature or qualities of the agent, who may then, in turn, be modified by the act. Though the scene-act and scene-agent ratios can often be extended to explain motives within this ratio, Burke says that with stress on the agent, there can be "very vague treatment of scene" (GM 17). So Russian soldiers acting out of patriotism does not require an explanation of socialist politics to allow understanding of the motive.

Burke begins with the end product (the speech, the words) and asks: what's behind this product? What are the speaker's true motives? His genius in providing the ratios as a means of analysis was to be look at the reversal of the two terms to find the dilemma and the real motive. In this way, the analysis moves beyond the stated motives and looks for either corroborating evidence in the remaining elements of the pentad, or to the truth of the motives by examining the reverse of those stated. For example, when President Bush made his speech from New Orleans, he claimed the actions of the government would overcome the situation. He proclaimed an act-scene ratio, precisely because he did not have it. Analyzing his attempt to speak a state into being using the scene-act ratio reveals the truth of the situation (scene still in control), and the motive for the act of giving the speech (to convince the public the scene was not still in control). The concept of the negative is also important in Burke's work as a human construction. There is no "not" in nature. What makes the "not" possible is that we are symbolic creatures. The scene is only what it is. It takes human perspective to add the "not," and the motivation to gain that which is missing can become purpose driving human action (as in a purpose-act ratio). The need to fill that which is not is part of the human sense of and need for order.

Dramatism allows for study of human relations and motives along a hierarchy that includes the desire for order. In Burke's view, life is drama, with the act at the center. Where there is an act, there must be an agent, and a scene, and so on. There is action, and where there is action, thus drama, there is conflict. If there is conflict, there is victimage. Humans see the world hierarchically and are motivated by that hierarchy. The hierarchy moves from guilt and the motivation to overcome guilt to reach redemption. This movement includes sacrificing, victimizing, and scapegoating as means to attain the redemption. The sacrifice is not always literal. It can be figurative because human are symbolizing animals and willing to accept symbolic sacrifice as redemptive.

Humans are moved to action through language not just because it is a one-way speaker to hearer persuasion, but also because it is a dialectical exchange where the speaker and hearer have some identification with one another. This concept of identification is one of Burke's biggest contributions to the field of rhetoric, and is a very useful resource for analyzing speaker motives, particularly language that seeks to build degrees of identification (likeness or sameness) across divisions. Burke recognized the universality of difference in humans, even prior to race, class or economic status. This inherent difference is the basis for rhetoric, for linguistic persuasion. If there were no division, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim unity.

Burke's dramatistic theory of rhetoric and the terminology he developed to analyze human relations and motives is arguably the most significant contribution to the field of rhetoric in the last century. By broadening the classical view of rhetoric, by developing an analytical frame that could apply to philosophical theories as well as draw connections to disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and even mysticism and science, Burke demonstrated the superiority of rhetoric over dialectic and reinvigorated rhetoric as a discipline.

Works Cited:
Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1969.

"Kenneth Burke: Theory of Dramatistic Rhetoric." James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William E. Coloeman. The Rhetoric of Western Thought. Fourth Edition. Dubuque, Iowa, Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 318-351. (JWT).

Posted by cageyer at 12:49 PM | Comments (0)

The Narrative Paradigm

Though this entry comes primarily under the heading of "Rhetoric", this particular theory also helps me frame my thoughts about globalization and its rhetorics. First, the theory, then the discussion in a separate post.

A Story-telling Frame for a Symbol-Using Animal

What began as a study of public moral argument with a focus on "the nuclear controversy" became for Walter Fisher a proposal for an alternative to the rational world paradigm for human communication. This alternative, the narrative paradigm, proceeds from the idea that reasoning "need not be bound to argumentative prose" but "may be discovered in all sorts of symbolic action—nondiscursive as well as discursive" (265). Fisher does not claim the narrative paradigm as the only way to understand human communication, nor is the concept entirely new with his proposal. Fisher's unique take on narrative perspective is to offer it as a paradigm, rather than as a genre or element of discourse (266-267).

Fisher cites a number of scholars whose work influenced his own, but his most significant intellectual debts are to Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue, for his characterization of man as a "story-telling animal" (265) and Kenneth Burke for his theories of persuasion through identification, consubstantiation, and the characterization of man as a symbolizing animal. These concepts helped Fisher expand his earlier work on the logic of good reasons, where he characterized humans as being "as much valuing as they are reasoning animals." Fisher's construction of narration is not the purely fictive version often associated with the genre, but rather he refers to "a theory of symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret them" (266). Following this description, the narrative paradigm views human communication as "stories competing with other stories constituted by good reasons" (266) in which argumentative discourse can be one form, but where rationality can also exist when the demands of narrative probability and narrative fidelity are satisfied.

Fisher classifies the rational world paradigm as the reigning one, dating back to Aristotle and beginning with the presupposition that humans as "essentially rational beings" (268). In this model, the mode of communication is argument, the conduct of which is ruled by the situation, with rationality measured by knowledge of the subject matter, of argumentation, and the rules of advocacy, and the world constructed as a set of logical puzzles to be solved. This model carries with it certain requirements, including a society that permits participation in decision-making, a common language, a general adherence to values of the state, information about the issues and an understanding of argument forms. These requirements, along with the general requirement of that being rational "must be learned" (269) make this model the basis for education in the West. The rational world model has been challenged by both naturalism and existentialism, but Fisher notes a recovery effort to re-establish the dominance of traditional rationalism.

In contrast to the reigning model, the narrative paradigm begins with the presupposition that "humans are essentially storytellers." Decision-making and communication proceed from "good reasons" which vary in form between situations, genres, and media, and are governed by history, biography, culture, character, and the forces of the "language act". Humans in this model determine rationality based on an "inherent awareness of narrative probability" and the habit of "testing narrative fidelity" (272). The world, then, is a set of stories, competing stories, and men choose among them to live the good life.

Where the philosophical ground of the rational world paradigm is epistemology, the ground of the narrative paradigm in ontology, and the materials are "symbols, signs of consubstantiation, and good reasons" (272). Actualization of the narrative paradigm comes not from a given form of society or a specific education, but emerges as an impulse of being and a "natural process of socialization" (272). Narrative rationality is not normative, but rather descriptive, and though it does not deny the hierarchy that traditional rationality depends on, it does condemn the "sort that is marked by the will to power" (274). The narrative paradigm subsumes the features of traditional rationality, in part because it is a capacity all humans share. This leads Fisher back to Burke in his claim that "the operative principle of narrative rationality is identification rather than deliberation (Burke 1955, 20-46)" (273).

In the realm of public policy and decision-making, the narrative paradigm suggests that the traditional view that rational decisions, good decisions, proceed from sufficient information has another dimension, and that is the quality of stories. As Fisher says, "some stories are better in satisfying the criteria of the logic of good reasons," and those stories influence opinion and decision-making. He uses the example of the dispute over a nuclear ban between experts Hans Bethe and Edward Teller. The vote, the declaration of public opinion, followed from issues of trust – or specifically distrust of Soviet leaders and trust of American leaders – a factor not accounted for in the rational world paradigm but one that make sense under the narrative paradigm. The expert in the narrative paradigm, then, assumes the role of counselor, of storyteller, a presenter not of final conclusions but of knowledge in a story of how life ought to be lived. The expert "becomes subject to the demands of narrative rationality" and the public makes decision based not on the rules of argument and specific knowledge, but on the adherence to narrative probability and fidelity.

Fisher claims the difference between the rational world and narrative paradigms are structural rather than substantive, since both are modes of "expressing good reasons" (279). When the metaphor of homo narrans, the metaphor of narration, is taken as the master metaphor, it subsumes other metaphors such as "rational man." These other metaphors serve as concepts that inform various ways of recounting and accounting for human choice and action. Recounting and accounting are narrative forms, the stories we tell ourselves to understand the world we inhabit, and an extension of the understanding of man as the symbol-using animal. Although Fisher anticipated critique of his theory and additional refinement of it through the critique, he also welcomed the "stories" that would emerge, framing in advance the entirety of the discussion as demonstration of his proposal.

Work Cited:
Fisher, Walter. “Narrative as Human Communication Paradigm.” Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader. Edited by John Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally Caudill. New York: The Guilford Press. 1999. 265-287.

additional notes below the fold

Fisher Notes:

"The logic of good reasons maintains that reasoning need not be bound to argumentative prose or be expressed in clear-cut inferential or implicative structures: Reasoning may be discovered in all sorts of symbolic action—nondiscursive as well as discursive" (265).

"By 'narration,' I refer to a theory of symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret them" (266)

"the narrative paradigm insists that human communication should be viewed as historical as well as situational, as stories competing with other stories constituted by good reasons, as being rational when they satisfy the demands of narrative probability and narrative fidelity, and as inevitably moral inducements. The narrative paradigm challenges the notions that human communication—if it is to be considered rhetorical—must be an argumentative form, that reason is to be attributed only to discourse marked by clearly identifiable modes of inference and/or implication, and that the norms for evaluation of rhetorical communication must be rational standards taken essentially from informal or formal logic. The narrative paradigm does not deny reason and rationality; it reconstitutes them, making them amenable to all forms of human communication" (266).

Paradigm = "a representation designed to formalize the structure of a component of experience and to direct understanding and inquiry into the nature and functions of that experience"

Not entirely new – appears in book and two essays on political and legal communication.

"The meaning and significance of life in all of its social dimensions require the recognition of its narrative structure" and "Any ethic, whether social, political, legal or otherwise, involves narrative" (267).

The reigning paradigm is the rational world paradigm. The narration paradigm is an alternative, not a replacement. It "subsumes" what has come before it.

The rational world paradigm presupposes that:
1. humans are essentially rational beings;
2. the paradigmatic mode of human decision-making and communication is argument—clear-cut inferential (implicative structures;
3. the conduct of argument is ruled by the dictates of situations—legal, scientific, legislative, public, and so on;
4. rationality is determined by subject matter knowledge, argumentative ability, and skill in employing the rules of advocacy in given fields;
5. the world is a set of logical puzzles which can be resolved through appropriate analysis and application of reason conceived as an argumentative construct.
In short, argument as product and process is the means of being human, the agency of all that humans can know and realize in achieving their telos. The philosophical ground of the rational world paradigm is epistemology. Its linguistic materials are self-evident propositions, demonstrations, and proofs, the verbal expressions of certain and probably knowing. (268 – all direct quote).

Requires:
A society that permits participation of qualified persons in public decision-making
A citizenry that shares a common language
General adherence to the values of the state,
Information relevant to the questions the confront the community to be arbitrated by argument
Understanding of argumentative issues, various forms of reasoning and their appropriate assessment.

"In other words, there must exist something that can be called public or social knowledge and there must be a 'public' for argument to be the kind of force envisioned for it" (268)

"Because the rational world paradigm has these requirements and because being rational (being competent in argument) must be learned, an historic mission of education in the West has been to generate a consciousness of national community and to instruct citizens in at least the rudiments of logic and rhetoric" (268).

Naturalism and existentialism have challenged the RWP, to the point where a recovery effort has been undertaken:
1. reconstituting the conception of knowledge
2. reconceptualizing the public –in terms of rational enterprises, fields, and/or communities
3. formulating a logic appropriate for for practical reasoning
4. reconceiving the conceptions of validity, reason, and rationality (269)

Root metaphors:
Homo faber, homo economous, homo politicos, homo sociologicus, "psychological man," "Ecclesiastical man," homo sapiens, and "rational man." Fisher is adding homo narrans to the list.

Each root metaphor can be held as the master with the others as figures. When any other is the master, narration functions as a type of interaction-activity. When narration becomes the master metaphor, it subsumes the others (270), turning them into "conceptions that inform various ways of recounting or accounting for human choice and action" (270). "The homo narrans metaphor is an incorporation and extension of Burke's definition of "man" as the "symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal" (271).

He goes on to relate the narrative paradigm to concepts of "fantasy themes," "rhetorical visions," and the language action paradigm. "language action is meaningful only in terms of narrative form" (271).

Presuppositions for narrative paradigm are:
1. humans are essentially storytellers;
2. the paradigmatic mode of human decision-making and communication is 'good reasons' which vary in form among communication situations, genres, and media;
3. the production and practice of good reasons is ruled by matters of history, biography, culture, and character along with the kinds of forces identified in the Frentz and Freell language act;
4. rationality is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings—their inherent awareness of narrative probability, what constitutes a coherent story, and their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, whether the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives; and
5. the world is a set of stories which must be chosen among to live the good life in a process of continual recreation.
"In short, good reasons are the stuff of stories, the means by which humans realize their nature as reasoning valuing animals. The philosophical ground of the narrative paradigm is ontology. The materials of the narrative paradigm are symbols, signs of consubstantiation, and good reasons, the communication expressions of social reality" (272 – all, all quoted).

Actualization of the NP does not require a given form of society, it is a natural result of socialization

"Narratives enable us to understand the actions of others "because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of narratives" (MacIntyre, 1981, 197)" (273).

Traditional rationality (RWP) differs from narrative rationality (NP) :
1. TR holds rationality as argumentative competence with knowledge of issues, modes of reasoning, appropriate tests and rules of advocacy, something to be learned, dependent on deliberation, requiring a high degree of self-consciousness. NR does not require all this – is is a capacity we all share (inference from symbolic clues). "The operative principle of narrative rationality is identification rather than deliberation" (273).
2. NR is not "an account of the 'laws of thought" and it is not normative. It is descriptive, and it offers a basis for critique because it implies a praxis (273).
3. TR implies a hierarchical system. NR doesn't deny hierarchy, but hold that the "people" judge, are qualified to judge, and have a "natural tendency" to prefer the true and the just. Does not deny that the "people" can be wrong, nor theory of genius. "The sort of hierarchy condemned by the narrative praxis is the sort that is marked by the will to power, the kind of system in which elites struggle to dominate and to use the people for their own ends or that makes the people blinds subjects of technology" (274).

Features of the NP:
1. ground for resolving the dualisms of modernism: fact-value, intellect-imagination, reasons-emotion, and so on. Stories are the enactment of the whole mind in concert with itself.
2. narratives are moral constructs
3. consonant with the notion of reason proposed by Schrag (…)
4. offers ways of resolving the problems of public moral argument (274)

"From the narrative perspective, the proper role of the expert in public moral argument is that of a counselor, which is, as Benjamin (1969) notes, the true function of the storyteller. His or her contribution to public dialogue is to impart knowledge, like a teacher, or wisdom, like a sage. It is not to pronounce a story that ends all storytelling. The expert assumes the role of public counselor whenever she or he crosses the boundary of technical knowledge into the territory of life as it ought to be lived. Once this invasion is made, the public, which then includes the expert, has its own criteria for determining whose story is most coherent and reliable as a guide to belief and action. The expert, in other words, then becomes subject to the demands of narrative rationality" (278).

"when arguers appealing to justice and equality content with adversaries who base their case on success, survival, and liberty, they talk past each other" (278). "rival stories are being told" (279).

Central to his argument:
"narration works by suggestion and identification; argument operates by inferential moves and deliberation. Both forms, however, are modes of expressing good reasons—given the narrative paradigm—so the differences between them are structural rather than substantive" (279).

Posted by cageyer at 12:07 PM | Comments (0)

Isocrates

Sophists, like Gorgias, taught ordinary people in Greece the art of rhetoric so those people would be able to doncut their own affairs, specifically judicial affairs, in the public forums of the day. For these teachers, the art of rhetoric was all about persuasion. They did not judge the merits of their client's claims or their intentions for using the skill, and they drew criticism for this.

isocrates opened the first school of rhetoric in Athens. His "Against the Sophists" is a critique of the sophists as teachers, as well as an announcement of how his school was different. Among his criticisms are that sophists asked for trust even while engaging in deceit, (referring to certain minor sophists who charged money even while affecting disdain for it), and that they asked for trust without being willing to show trust to their students (referring to a payment in advance policy). He also faults the sophists for discounting their teaching, and thus devaluing their subject. "Inconsistencies in deeds" should, by Isocrates' count, lead laypersons to scrutinize the teachings of such men for pretense (73). The teacher of rhetoric should first be an upright (good) man, a living example of what he would teach.

Before the example about money, Isocrates observes that the teachers promise more than they can fulfill, that they are to be condemned for being devoted to "disputation" and "pretend[ing] to search for truth" when that certainty is not possible. Such promises lead to "a life of careless indolence."

What the teachers should do is "state the facts" (72). One of these is that the student must have some native ability. Oratory requires agility, not mere memorization or rehearsal of forms. The orator must be able to respond to the occasion. Letters (or writing) don't require this agility because they are fixed, and used the same way over and over. But "oratory is good only if it has the qualities of fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment” (72). And while training can help one without natural ability, Isocrates is clear about the latter's importance: “[formal training] cannot fully fashion men who are without natural aptitude into good debaters or writers” (74).

The importance of fitness for the occasion (kairos) means that generalities are not as valuable as specifics, and what works generally for one orator in a particular situation won't meet the needs of another. Thus, the teachers can't simply pass on general principles - there must also be knowledge, and this requires "much study" by "a vigorous and imaginative mind" (74).

While "Against the Sophists" argues largely against certain practices of the day, "Antidosis" is more a proposition and explanation of what should be true, a defense of Isocrates' beliefs and theory of rhetorical education. In this essay we learn that for Isocrates, what counts as philosophy is the knowledge and practice of governing one's household and community well. Rhetoric has a very practical function, both in terms of facilitating governance, but also in demonstrating character: “the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul” (75). Training in an art that does not function in the present to improve speech or actions shouldn't be called philosophy, but rather a "gymnastic of the mind" (75). This clearly separates his theory from that of Plato. “I hold that men who want to do some good in the world must banish utterly from their interests all vain speculations and all activities which have no bearing on our lives” (76).

This is not to say that philosophy has no value, but rather that since absolute truth cannot be certainly attained by humans, a properly conceived philosophy is practical. Isocrates holds "that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight” (77). Such studies and insight are not to be separated from public life, however, because "people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well, if they become possessed of the desire to be able to persuade their hearers, and finally, if they set their hearts on seizing their advantage” (77).

Advantage is not merely a competitive edge at a particular moment. It is a much longer range view, taking into account a future "at the hands of the gods" where “those receive the better portion at the hand men who are the most conscientious in their dealings with their associates…and are themselves esteemed as the noblest among their fellows” (78). The wise man who desires to speak well gains advantage by being conscientious and noble - a good man who speaks well (gee, where will I hear that later?). Such a man will:

Additional thoughts about the good man:

Isocrates condemns those who drive away the youth, or whose instruction encourages them to wasteful hours in the tavern or by the fountains, “in soft living and childish folly”. Hence, the instructor is to encourage the young men to the wise government of home and commonwealth.

Works Cited:
“Against the Sophists.” Translated by George Norlin. Bizzell and Herberg. 72-75.
"Antidosis." Translated by George Norlin. Bizzell and Herberg. 75-79.

Posted by cageyer at 11:53 AM | Comments (0)

February 22, 2007

Plato

It seems the discipline of rhetoric may never cease struggling to recover from Plato's criticism of it. In the two dialogs, "Gorgias" and "Phaedrus," Plato's concerns are revealed primarily through the questions and comments offered by Socrates. But while Plato (in Socrates) is commonly held to have compared rhetoric to "mere cookery," a closer reading of the dialogs shows his assessment to be more nuanced than that.

In the Phaedrus, rhetoric is compared to someone persuading one to buy an ass as a horse, when the buyer didn’t know what a horse was, highlighting the features of a horse when the beast is not a horse. That’s bad. Orators who do not know good from evil but undertake to persuade the state to an action anyway are similarly bad. This concern is also raised is Gorgias, but not as specifically or clearly, since there Socrates only raises the question about the function of the rhetorician (to persuade but not to instruct as to good or evil).

Back in the Phaedrus, Socrates claims rhetoric, “an art which leads the soul by means of words” is equally concerned with small and large things. He goes on to comment that a rhetorician can make the same thing appear just and unjust to different audiences, can make an issue seem to the state good or not good at different times (which, again, is the problem).

After reciting the several elements that are in the books on rhetoric, Socrates compares rhetoric to the art of healing, the latter concerned with the body and the former with the soul. In this section one might think Socrates is actually okay with rhetoric, as he discusses the need for the would-be rhetor to learn study and learn to be good at it:

unless a man take account of the characters of his hearers and is able to divide things by classes and to comprehend particulars under a general idea, he will never attain the highest human perfection in the art of speech. But this ability he will not gain without much diligent toil, which a wise man ought not to undergo for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak and to do everything, so far as possible, in a manner pleasing to the gods. (164).
This last reference, of being pleasing to the gods, seems to give rhetoric as practice a good status.

Socrates next comments on writing - which he faults because it cannot engage in dialog, can't respond to questions about its meaning. This, combined with the way written words can be used by both those who understand the meaning and those who don't, creates for him the same problems as rhetoric does. Not because rhetoric is inherently bad, but because it is too easy for rhetoric to be good but not the best, not motivated by pure ideals, rightness or understanding.

This leads us to Plato's reference to cookery. It's not just that rhetoric is like cookery, though Socrates does refer to both of them as producing gratification and pleasure, but that each of these compares to a more serious practice and falls short.

Socrates distinguishes two arts, one, called politics, having to do with the soul and broken down into legislation and justice, and the other having to do with the body and broken down to gymnastics and medicine. Gymnastics to the body is similar to legislation to the soul, and the same with justice and medicine. The first functions to maintain, the latter to repair, or heal. But if flattery comes alone, and pretends to be any of these arts without caring for what is best, she deceives. Offering that which is most immediately pleasant instead of what is best, flattery deceives and leads to folly. In this analogy, "cookery assumes the form of medicine, and pretends to know what foods are best for the body" and so there is a corresponding flattery for each of the four arts:

cookery is flattery disguised as medicine; and in just the same manner self-adornment personates gymnastic: with its rascally, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal nature it deceives men by forms and colors, polish and dress, so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through gymnastic. Well, to avoid prolixity, I am willing to put it to you like a geometer…as self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice… (98).
Thus rhetoric, falling into this category of flattery, is not an art, but merely a habitude (production of gratification and pleasure), and it is a disgrace precisely because it "aims at the pleasant and ignores the best" (98).

But Socrates isn't finished with this analogy. After a long part of the dialog having to do with philosophy and the kind of men who should rule in the society, he returns to this comparison to distinguish between sophistic and rhetoric and as he makes this separation he also manages to speak back to Gorgias's comment about the teachers not being responsible for the student misusing the skill:

in reality sophistic is a finer thing than rhetoric by so much as legislation is finer than judicature, and gymnastic than medicine: in fact, for my own part, I always regarded public speakers and sophists as the only people who have no call to complain of the thing that they themselves educate, for its wickedness towards them; as otherwise they must in the same words be also charging themselves with having been of no use to those whom they say they benefit (134).

Gorgias concludes with Socrates emphasizing the importance of being good (rather than just appearing so), of being just, of correcting wrong in every case, of avoiding flattery (as described in the analogy) and by using rhetoric soley for the purpose of "point to what is just" (138).

I'm not convinced, based on these dialogs, that Plato is all that hostile to rhetoric, despite its negative potential. Further, I think the difference between Plato's often referred to comparison of rhetoric to cookery is reductive, and that an effort needs to be make to really draw out the point he is actually making. This is an argument for more emphasis on learning these foundational texts, for reading them carefully taking the time to fully understand these theories.

Plato. “Gorgias.” Bizzell and Herzberg. 87-138.
Plato. “Phaedrus.” Bizzell and Herzberg. 138-168.

Posted by cageyer at 07:43 PM | Comments (0)

Gorgias

In Plato's dialogue, Gorgias explains to Socrates that rhetoric is the art concerned with speech, and that is deals with the greatest of human affairs, "the ability to persuade with speeches either judges in the law courts or statesmen in the council-chamber or the commons in the Assembly or an audience at any other meeting that may be held on public affairs…" (90). He then agrees with Socrates that the rhetorician is concerned only with "persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and wrong" (92). This distinction, and the power of rhetoric to persuade to belief without an apparent concern for right or wrong, is at the heart of Plato's objection to rhetoric, and his objection to the teachers of that art. But Gorgias observes, as Blair would echo centuries later, that

our use of rhetoric should be like our use of any other sort of exercise…if a man becomes a rhetorician and then uses this power and this art unfairly, we ought not to hate his teacher and cast him out of our cities…it is the man who does not use it aright who deserves to be hated and expelled and put to death, not his teacher. (93)
. Gorgias was not merely a teacher of rhetoric, he was also a skilled speaker.

In order to display the power of words to persuade, he takes on the defense of Helen, arguing in part that she was swayed by the “powerful lord” of speech.

Gorgias begins by stating his purpose: “For my part, by introducing some reasoning into my speech, I wish to free the accused of blame and, having reproved her detractors as prevaricators and proved the truth, to free her from their ignorance” (44).

He outlines her lineage, and then sets up possible causes for Helen having been taken: “by will of Fate and decision of the gods and vote of Necessity…or by force reduced…or by words seduced…of by love possessed” (45). For each of these Gorgias offers a defense by which Helen cannot be considered guilty. Fate, the gods and force are all more powerful the human (in the latter case, he refers to rape), and love is either a force of the gods, or an affliction of the human soul, but in neither case is it a sin. And then there's speech, the key pupose for Gorgias's speech. He says, “if it was speech which persuaded her and deceived her heart, not even to this is it difficult to make an answer and to banish blame as follows. Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity” (45). He compares the influence of speech to being "ravished by the force of the mighty” (45), and claims that “The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies” (46).

When he finishes the explanation, he offers a recap. Once again, Helen is excused because speech is so powerful: “It has been explained that if she was persuaded by speech she did not do wrong but was unfortunate” (46). And then he offers a conclusion that both recaps his purpose and congratulates himself on his success: “I have by means of speech removed disgrace from a women; I have observed the procedure which I set up at the beginning of the speech; I have tried to end the injustice of blame and the ignorance of opinion; I wished to write a speech which would be a praise of Helen and a diversion to myself” (46).

So he begins by saying he can, by speech, clear Helen's name, points out in the middle that each of his points, particularly the one about speech, is right, and at the end announces that he has accomplished his task. He never once seeks or secures the consent of the audience to this fact – I guess that comes after. But at the very beginning, he establishes this as an epideictic speech (of praise or blame) and seeks to shift blame to praise, or at least, to remove blame.


Works Cited:
Gorgias. “Encomium of Helen.” Bizzell & Herzberg. 44-46.
Plato. “Gorgias.” Bizzell and Herzberg. 87-138.

Posted by cageyer at 03:15 PM | Comments (0)

February 17, 2007

More on Aristotle

Aristotle wrote on almost every area of knowledge in the ancient world, which explains in part why so many disciplines trace their origins to Aristotle and his writings. In the case of rhetoric, rather than debate the potential uses of rhetoric (good or bad), he preferred to sort through all that was known and give it a systematic order. This order has come down through the centuries, and the his classifications of the types of speeches, the types of appeal, the topics, and the other elements of rhetoric he taught are still the core of classical rhetoric theory.

Recall that from Aristotle's point of view, the audience determined the objective of the speech. In Chapter 3 of Book One, he writes: “The species of rhetoric are three in number; for such is the number [of classes] to which the hearers of speeches belong. A speech [situation] consists of three things: a speaker and a subject on which he speaks and someone addressed, and the objective [telos] of the speech relates to the last” (47). Hearers can be spectators, in which case the objective of the speech is epideictic, in the present, either praise or blame; judges of past happenings, in which case the speech is forensic, or judicial, accusation or defense; or judges of future happenings, in which case the speech is deliberative, exhortation or disuasion.

In this teaching, rhetoric is public. Topoi – or topics – were common topics of the day, or "places to look" for arguments, beginning points for public deliberation. We might think of these as prompts, or structural devices such as comparison. Aristotle divided the topics into categories: ethical, where he included political, logical and physical. Rhetoric is concerned with the first two.

Aristotle viewed dialectic as dealing with generalities and rhetoric more with specifics. Similary, he viewed the nature of the law at two levels. At the general level, the deliberative level, the law was to be made as specific as possible and to allow the least room for interpretation by the judges, “…but it is necessary to leave to the judges the question of whether something has happened or has not happened, will or will not be, is or is not the case; for the lawmaker cannot forsee these things” (31).

The end of rhetoric has been translated as "persuasion" but the Greek word, pistis can also be translated as belief, or proof. These are all similar in that they indicate agreement beyond mere assent. Aristotle classified the pisteis available through speech into three catagories: "some are in the character [ethos] of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way [leading the hearers to feel emotion, pathos], and some in the argument [logos] itself, by showing or seeming to show something” (37). Importantly, with respect to the character of the speaker, this was not a reputation the speaker brought to the occasion, but rather a quality indicated through the speech itself. In Book 2, Aristotle offered three things that made a speaker persuasive, beyond logical demonstrations. "These are practical wisdom [phronesis] and virtue [arête] and good will [eunoia]; for speakers make mistakes in what they say or advise through [failure to exhibit] either all or one of these” (121). Several chapters of Book 2 are dedicated to explaining various emotions (states of mind) in hearers and the potential effects for the speaker, with additional chapters showing how the status of different hearers (young, old, prime of life, wealthy, powerful, of good birth) can affect receptivity.

Beyond the classifications of speeches and persuasive means, Aristotle may be most well know for the rhetorical syllogism, or enthymeme. In Book 1, he writes: “I call a rhetorical syllogism an enthymeme, a rhetorical induction a paradigm” (40). All logical persuasion proceeds from one of these. Aristotle believed that style and delivery were of secondary importance to the substance of an argument, which has been interpreted to say that he privileged rational (logos) appeals over those of ethos or pathos. This emphasis on logic is consistent with an audience familiar with dialectic, but also consistent with Aristotle's interest in science, and his belief that precision in language could ensure the response of the audience.

The enthymeme is a strucutre where conclusions proceed from premises. The rhetorical paradigm is inductive, drawing from many instances to a general conclusion. But Aristotle understood the limits of an audience, so he emphasized that for rhetoric, there should be few premises (specifically, fewer than a primary syllogism in dialectic. The conclusions should come from too far back, nor should all the steps be included, because both a long argument or a repetition of the obvious is tiresome to the audience (or hard to follow). Aristotle explains that the reason some "uneducated" speakers seem to be more effective is because of their emphasis on the immediate and direct.

In Book 3, Aristotle discusses style, delivery, and arrangement. Again, he focuses on clarity: “let the virtue of style be defined as ‘to be clear’…and neither flat nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate” (221). There should be a balance between plainness and poetry, and an appropriate use of figures such as metaphor. Delivery includes volume, pitch, and rhythm (again the classifications), while style includes sentence structure, diction and word choice.

In Chapter 15 of Book 3, under the category of taxis, Aristotle discusses how to repel a prejudical attack. These questions of what it as issue would later develop into stasis theory. Kennedy comments that Aristotle's placement of this analysis under arrangement, rather than under invention, may have been why his Rhetoric wasn't much studied in later antiquity and the Byzantine periods (266).

Plato and Isocrates had more influence on the Romans than Aristotle, partly because his works were lost after he left the Peripetic school to one of his pupils. Cicero recovered that work, and followed Aristotle in the five part process for composing a speech. Aristotle never actually outlines the five step process we know as the canons of rhetoric. It was later rhetors who extrapolated the principles and summarized them in five categories.

Posted by cageyer at 09:55 AM | Comments (0)

February 16, 2007

A more reasoned approach

"So what is rhetoric? How do you define it?" Wise Woman asked.
"I still like Aristotle's definition: the art of finding, for any situation, the available means of persuasion" humble student replied.
"Is that where you want to begin?" Wise Woman asked.
"Yes, and here's why..."

After that last semi-public spontaneous overflow of pent-up frustration, I'd like to welcome my readers back to Dawgnotes for the first of a series of most reasoned posts. (I'm sorry that I haven't figured out the whole comments problem yet, because I'd appreciate any feedback).

I do like to begin with Aristotle, even though the history of rhetoric predates his teaching, and even though it was Plato who gave the art its name as we know it. It's not just because of the definition, although I find that extremely useful, but also because Aristotle's work give the subject a framework, a set of terminology and some helpful divisions that I have found not only useful for analysis, but also for understanding theories of rhetoric that came later. It's not that all the theories are just variations on Aristotle, nor that all the theories can be reframed into his definition. Rather, if you take Aristotle's definition and break it down to its components, it becomes easier to chart the differences that emerge over time.

Aristotle wrote, “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion" (36).

Posing this definition with the first word "let" sets it up as a premise to be built on, rather than a proposition to be proved of itself. The entire definition poses an analytical process - an ability to see, which is not the same as an ability to practice the identified means, and yet the successful practice would also require the ability to identify the available options, and making a determination as to the most effective one. So while analysis and practice can be separated here, it is a symbiotic separation.

Kennedy brackets the word "particular" but I believe it's an essential modifier for a broad application of this definition. "Each case" should indicate that every situation is unique, but the inclusion of "particular" makes that clear. Aristotle says it is the hearer(s), the audience to whom the speech is addressed, that determines the objective [telos] of the speech (and therefore, logically, its success). What all makes up the case? The audience, certainly, but also the culture from which the audience and speaker emerge, education, religion or other values/beliefs, the political structure and the degree to which public discourse is encouraged, supported, repressed or limited, the occasion or prompt for the speech, or just the dispostion of the audience that day. All these things make up the case, or the situation, or the scene, in which the rhetoric event takes place. And each of this is different. Hence the first question is: what is the case? what are the factors that make up the setting for this rhetorical event, and how, if at all, might those factors sway the outcome of the event? Both the analyst examing the event after the fact and the rhetor preparing for the vent need to understand, as much as possible, what the case is.

The next piece is the "available means." This includes not only the appeals through logos, pathos and ethos, but also avenues of access. Editors Joy Ritchie and Kay Ronald choose this phrase for the title to their anthology of women's rhetoric, calling attention to the fact that for women, many means were not available to them. (Note that I did not include this anthology on my original reading list, but having read what I've read, I now think it belongs there). Denied a place in the public realm, women had to find other ways to get their message out, to get assistance or justice when needed. They had to be able to see beyond the immediate and find what was available to them through connections, relationships, conversation or even letter writing. I'm thinking here of Aspasia, who in Cheryl Glenn's historical reconstruction, used her sexual access to Pericles to get her words into the public forum. At the same time, Pericles used what was available to him, Aspasia's brilliance, to find the words, the phrases, and perhaps even the rehearsal to make the funeral speech that brought him honor. Aspasia didn't appeal to be allowed to speak in public herself, but she did ensure that her words, and therefore she, would not be lost in history.

This phrase can also be broken down into its two parts: available, and means. What is available? Not just counting the public forums, or the call to speak, or the designated places for public discourse, but what relationships or avenues are available to the would be rhetor? For example, Julian of Norwich invoked the authority of God speaking through her. That made speaking/writing for a public audience available to her in a time where women, particularly in the church, were denied public speech. In the nineteenth century, African American women found availability to speak in the work of women's clubs and other platforms for social reforms. The other question - that of means - is also important. What means can be/were employed in the situation? Means could be a public speech, a private conversation, a letter, a messenger, a song, a story, or even a poem. In any case, some means are available and some aren't, and when more than one means is available, the rhetor choose a course, and the analyst later evaluates that choice.

Of persuasion. Kennedy and other historians have noted that in Aristotle's Athens, rhetorical contests were highly agonistic, a reflection of a society that valued competition whether in war or sport (the Olympics were a Greek invention that served a valuable purpose for warriors not at war, and satisfied the cultural desire for competition), or public speech/debate. The measure of persuasion was a favorable decision by the audience. Whether in cases of a policy to be adopted, or the investigation into a breach of that policy and the necessary penalty, that rhetor was successful who got the audience to vote as he wished. But in other societies, where such agonistic debate was not so highly valued, the measure of persuasion necessarily changed. In nearly every case, as Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca explained, the measure of persuasion ultimately was/is the adherence of the audience to the belief that the rhetor proposed, as shown by action.

"So," Wise Woman asked, "is rhetoric always analysis?"
"Yes," said humble student, "except when it is practice."

Stay tuned. More follows.

Posted by cageyer at 07:12 PM | Comments (0)