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February 23, 2007
The Narrative Paradigm
Though this entry comes primarily under the heading of "Rhetoric", this particular theory also helps me frame my thoughts about globalization and its rhetorics. First, the theory, then the discussion in a separate post.
What began as a study of public moral argument with a focus on "the nuclear controversy" became for Walter Fisher a proposal for an alternative to the rational world paradigm for human communication. This alternative, the narrative paradigm, proceeds from the idea that reasoning "need not be bound to argumentative prose" but "may be discovered in all sorts of symbolic action—nondiscursive as well as discursive" (265). Fisher does not claim the narrative paradigm as the only way to understand human communication, nor is the concept entirely new with his proposal. Fisher's unique take on narrative perspective is to offer it as a paradigm, rather than as a genre or element of discourse (266-267).
Fisher cites a number of scholars whose work influenced his own, but his most significant intellectual debts are to Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue, for his characterization of man as a "story-telling animal" (265) and Kenneth Burke for his theories of persuasion through identification, consubstantiation, and the characterization of man as a symbolizing animal. These concepts helped Fisher expand his earlier work on the logic of good reasons, where he characterized humans as being "as much valuing as they are reasoning animals." Fisher's construction of narration is not the purely fictive version often associated with the genre, but rather he refers to "a theory of symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret them" (266). Following this description, the narrative paradigm views human communication as "stories competing with other stories constituted by good reasons" (266) in which argumentative discourse can be one form, but where rationality can also exist when the demands of narrative probability and narrative fidelity are satisfied.
Fisher classifies the rational world paradigm as the reigning one, dating back to Aristotle and beginning with the presupposition that humans as "essentially rational beings" (268). In this model, the mode of communication is argument, the conduct of which is ruled by the situation, with rationality measured by knowledge of the subject matter, of argumentation, and the rules of advocacy, and the world constructed as a set of logical puzzles to be solved. This model carries with it certain requirements, including a society that permits participation in decision-making, a common language, a general adherence to values of the state, information about the issues and an understanding of argument forms. These requirements, along with the general requirement of that being rational "must be learned" (269) make this model the basis for education in the West. The rational world model has been challenged by both naturalism and existentialism, but Fisher notes a recovery effort to re-establish the dominance of traditional rationalism.
In contrast to the reigning model, the narrative paradigm begins with the presupposition that "humans are essentially storytellers." Decision-making and communication proceed from "good reasons" which vary in form between situations, genres, and media, and are governed by history, biography, culture, character, and the forces of the "language act". Humans in this model determine rationality based on an "inherent awareness of narrative probability" and the habit of "testing narrative fidelity" (272). The world, then, is a set of stories, competing stories, and men choose among them to live the good life.
Where the philosophical ground of the rational world paradigm is epistemology, the ground of the narrative paradigm in ontology, and the materials are "symbols, signs of consubstantiation, and good reasons" (272). Actualization of the narrative paradigm comes not from a given form of society or a specific education, but emerges as an impulse of being and a "natural process of socialization" (272). Narrative rationality is not normative, but rather descriptive, and though it does not deny the hierarchy that traditional rationality depends on, it does condemn the "sort that is marked by the will to power" (274). The narrative paradigm subsumes the features of traditional rationality, in part because it is a capacity all humans share. This leads Fisher back to Burke in his claim that "the operative principle of narrative rationality is identification rather than deliberation (Burke 1955, 20-46)" (273).
In the realm of public policy and decision-making, the narrative paradigm suggests that the traditional view that rational decisions, good decisions, proceed from sufficient information has another dimension, and that is the quality of stories. As Fisher says, "some stories are better in satisfying the criteria of the logic of good reasons," and those stories influence opinion and decision-making. He uses the example of the dispute over a nuclear ban between experts Hans Bethe and Edward Teller. The vote, the declaration of public opinion, followed from issues of trust – or specifically distrust of Soviet leaders and trust of American leaders – a factor not accounted for in the rational world paradigm but one that make sense under the narrative paradigm. The expert in the narrative paradigm, then, assumes the role of counselor, of storyteller, a presenter not of final conclusions but of knowledge in a story of how life ought to be lived. The expert "becomes subject to the demands of narrative rationality" and the public makes decision based not on the rules of argument and specific knowledge, but on the adherence to narrative probability and fidelity.
Fisher claims the difference between the rational world and narrative paradigms are structural rather than substantive, since both are modes of "expressing good reasons" (279). When the metaphor of homo narrans, the metaphor of narration, is taken as the master metaphor, it subsumes other metaphors such as "rational man." These other metaphors serve as concepts that inform various ways of recounting and accounting for human choice and action. Recounting and accounting are narrative forms, the stories we tell ourselves to understand the world we inhabit, and an extension of the understanding of man as the symbol-using animal. Although Fisher anticipated critique of his theory and additional refinement of it through the critique, he also welcomed the "stories" that would emerge, framing in advance the entirety of the discussion as demonstration of his proposal.
Work Cited:
Fisher, Walter. “Narrative as Human Communication Paradigm.” Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader. Edited by John Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally Caudill. New York: The Guilford Press. 1999. 265-287.
additional notes below the fold
Fisher Notes:
"The logic of good reasons maintains that reasoning need not be bound to argumentative prose or be expressed in clear-cut inferential or implicative structures: Reasoning may be discovered in all sorts of symbolic action—nondiscursive as well as discursive" (265).
"By 'narration,' I refer to a theory of symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret them" (266)
"the narrative paradigm insists that human communication should be viewed as historical as well as situational, as stories competing with other stories constituted by good reasons, as being rational when they satisfy the demands of narrative probability and narrative fidelity, and as inevitably moral inducements. The narrative paradigm challenges the notions that human communication—if it is to be considered rhetorical—must be an argumentative form, that reason is to be attributed only to discourse marked by clearly identifiable modes of inference and/or implication, and that the norms for evaluation of rhetorical communication must be rational standards taken essentially from informal or formal logic. The narrative paradigm does not deny reason and rationality; it reconstitutes them, making them amenable to all forms of human communication" (266).
Paradigm = "a representation designed to formalize the structure of a component of experience and to direct understanding and inquiry into the nature and functions of that experience"
Not entirely new – appears in book and two essays on political and legal communication.
"The meaning and significance of life in all of its social dimensions require the recognition of its narrative structure" and "Any ethic, whether social, political, legal or otherwise, involves narrative" (267).
The reigning paradigm is the rational world paradigm. The narration paradigm is an alternative, not a replacement. It "subsumes" what has come before it.
The rational world paradigm presupposes that:
1. humans are essentially rational beings;
2. the paradigmatic mode of human decision-making and communication is argument—clear-cut inferential (implicative structures;
3. the conduct of argument is ruled by the dictates of situations—legal, scientific, legislative, public, and so on;
4. rationality is determined by subject matter knowledge, argumentative ability, and skill in employing the rules of advocacy in given fields;
5. the world is a set of logical puzzles which can be resolved through appropriate analysis and application of reason conceived as an argumentative construct.
In short, argument as product and process is the means of being human, the agency of all that humans can know and realize in achieving their telos. The philosophical ground of the rational world paradigm is epistemology. Its linguistic materials are self-evident propositions, demonstrations, and proofs, the verbal expressions of certain and probably knowing. (268 – all direct quote).
Requires:
A society that permits participation of qualified persons in public decision-making
A citizenry that shares a common language
General adherence to the values of the state,
Information relevant to the questions the confront the community to be arbitrated by argument
Understanding of argumentative issues, various forms of reasoning and their appropriate assessment.
"In other words, there must exist something that can be called public or social knowledge and there must be a 'public' for argument to be the kind of force envisioned for it" (268)
"Because the rational world paradigm has these requirements and because being rational (being competent in argument) must be learned, an historic mission of education in the West has been to generate a consciousness of national community and to instruct citizens in at least the rudiments of logic and rhetoric" (268).
Naturalism and existentialism have challenged the RWP, to the point where a recovery effort has been undertaken:
1. reconstituting the conception of knowledge
2. reconceptualizing the public –in terms of rational enterprises, fields, and/or communities
3. formulating a logic appropriate for for practical reasoning
4. reconceiving the conceptions of validity, reason, and rationality (269)
Root metaphors:
Homo faber, homo economous, homo politicos, homo sociologicus, "psychological man," "Ecclesiastical man," homo sapiens, and "rational man." Fisher is adding homo narrans to the list.
Each root metaphor can be held as the master with the others as figures. When any other is the master, narration functions as a type of interaction-activity. When narration becomes the master metaphor, it subsumes the others (270), turning them into "conceptions that inform various ways of recounting or accounting for human choice and action" (270). "The homo narrans metaphor is an incorporation and extension of Burke's definition of "man" as the "symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal" (271).
He goes on to relate the narrative paradigm to concepts of "fantasy themes," "rhetorical visions," and the language action paradigm. "language action is meaningful only in terms of narrative form" (271).
Presuppositions for narrative paradigm are:
1. humans are essentially storytellers;
2. the paradigmatic mode of human decision-making and communication is 'good reasons' which vary in form among communication situations, genres, and media;
3. the production and practice of good reasons is ruled by matters of history, biography, culture, and character along with the kinds of forces identified in the Frentz and Freell language act;
4. rationality is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings—their inherent awareness of narrative probability, what constitutes a coherent story, and their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, whether the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives; and
5. the world is a set of stories which must be chosen among to live the good life in a process of continual recreation.
"In short, good reasons are the stuff of stories, the means by which humans realize their nature as reasoning valuing animals. The philosophical ground of the narrative paradigm is ontology. The materials of the narrative paradigm are symbols, signs of consubstantiation, and good reasons, the communication expressions of social reality" (272 – all, all quoted).
Actualization of the NP does not require a given form of society, it is a natural result of socialization
"Narratives enable us to understand the actions of others "because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of narratives" (MacIntyre, 1981, 197)" (273).
Traditional rationality (RWP) differs from narrative rationality (NP) :
1. TR holds rationality as argumentative competence with knowledge of issues, modes of reasoning, appropriate tests and rules of advocacy, something to be learned, dependent on deliberation, requiring a high degree of self-consciousness. NR does not require all this – is is a capacity we all share (inference from symbolic clues). "The operative principle of narrative rationality is identification rather than deliberation" (273).
2. NR is not "an account of the 'laws of thought" and it is not normative. It is descriptive, and it offers a basis for critique because it implies a praxis (273).
3. TR implies a hierarchical system. NR doesn't deny hierarchy, but hold that the "people" judge, are qualified to judge, and have a "natural tendency" to prefer the true and the just. Does not deny that the "people" can be wrong, nor theory of genius. "The sort of hierarchy condemned by the narrative praxis is the sort that is marked by the will to power, the kind of system in which elites struggle to dominate and to use the people for their own ends or that makes the people blinds subjects of technology" (274).
Features of the NP:
1. ground for resolving the dualisms of modernism: fact-value, intellect-imagination, reasons-emotion, and so on. Stories are the enactment of the whole mind in concert with itself.
2. narratives are moral constructs
3. consonant with the notion of reason proposed by Schrag (…)
4. offers ways of resolving the problems of public moral argument (274)
"From the narrative perspective, the proper role of the expert in public moral argument is that of a counselor, which is, as Benjamin (1969) notes, the true function of the storyteller. His or her contribution to public dialogue is to impart knowledge, like a teacher, or wisdom, like a sage. It is not to pronounce a story that ends all storytelling. The expert assumes the role of public counselor whenever she or he crosses the boundary of technical knowledge into the territory of life as it ought to be lived. Once this invasion is made, the public, which then includes the expert, has its own criteria for determining whose story is most coherent and reliable as a guide to belief and action. The expert, in other words, then becomes subject to the demands of narrative rationality" (278).
"when arguers appealing to justice and equality content with adversaries who base their case on success, survival, and liberty, they talk past each other" (278). "rival stories are being told" (279).
Central to his argument:
"narration works by suggestion and identification; argument operates by inferential moves and deliberation. Both forms, however, are modes of expressing good reasons—given the narrative paradigm—so the differences between them are structural rather than substantive" (279).
Posted by cageyer at February 23, 2007 12:07 PM